[명사 현장 칼럼] 북핵문제의 재평가 (Nuclear North Korea: A Reassessment)
입력 2016.01.08 (18:35)
수정 2016.01.08 (18:58)
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[한승주 고려대학교 명예교수, 전 외무부장관]
1월 6일 북한은 4차 핵실험을 감행하고 소형의 수소탄 시험에 성공했다고 발표했다. 그것은 한국, 미국, 일본뿐 아니라 중국, 러시아까지도 경악하고 분개하게 만들었다. 유엔 안보리는 지금까지의 제재보다도 더 강력하고 중대한 추가 제재를 부과하기로 합의했다. 북한은 자신의 핵무기 개발과 핵실험이 미국의 위협과 압박에 대항하기 위한 것이라고 주장했다. 그러나 이번 핵실험은(그것이 수소탄이건, 증폭핵분열탄이건 간에) 다음의 목적이 있었던 것으로 보인다.
북한의 핵실험 목적
1. 김정은의 생일 이틀 전, 또 5월의 7차 노동당 대회를 앞둔 시점이라는 점에서 김정은의 흔들리는 국내정치적 위상을 높이고 그의 “업적”을 과시하기 위한 것.
2. 북한이 미국을 위협할 수 있는 핵 능력을 가졌다는 것을 과시함으로써 미국의 관심을 모으고 미국과 협상의 발판을 마련하기 위한 것.
3. 중국이 북한에 대하여 4차 핵실험을 하지 말라는 압력을 가하는데 대하여 중국에게 굴종하지 않겠다는 결의를 보이기 위한 것.
4. 국제 사회로부터 북한이 핵 보유국이라는 공식 인정을 받기 위한 것.
5. 북한은 절대로 핵을 포기하지 않겠다는 의지를 강조하기 위한 것 등이라고 하겠다.
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북핵
북핵 문제가 어떻게 이러한 상황에 이르게 되었는가? 혹자는 1차 핵문제가 야기된 1993년 미국이 제네바 합의 (Geneva Agreed Framework)를 체결함으로써 북한에게 핵무기를 생산하고 보유할 빌미와 기회를 주었다고 주장한다. 그러나 제네바 합의는 북한의 핵활동을 동결시켰고 그 대가로 받는 경수로가 완성되는 시점에 북한이 모든 핵 시설을 폐기하고 핵 프로그램을 중단하는 것을 규정하였다. 제네바 합의가 2003년 폐지된 것은 북한이 1990년대 말부터 비밀리에 농축우라늄 프로그램을 시작하여 합의를 위반했기 때문이었다. 2003년 공개적으로 핵 활동을 재개한 북한은 6자회담을 통한 협상을 간헐적으로 진행하는 한편 핵무기 개발에 박차를 가하여 2005년 말까지는 두 가지 방법 (플루토니움과 농축 우라니움)을 통해 추산하여 20여개의 핵 폭탄을 보유하게 되었다. 워싱턴에 소재한 38 North라는 기관에 의하면 북한은 2020년 까지는 50 내지 100개의 핵폭탄을 갖게 될 것이라고 한다. 북한은 자신이 명실상부한 핵 보유국이라고 주장하는 한편 2012년 그것을 헌법 서문에 명기했다. 2013년 북한은 핵실험으로 인한 유엔의 제재를 받고 있음에도 불구하고 경제와 핵 무력을 동시에 추구하는 “병진정책”을 채택하였다. 이렇듯 핵 탄두를 운반, 발사할 수 있는 장, 단거리 미사일과 잠수함발사 탄도 유도탄(Submarine-launched ballistic missile, SLBM)을 적재할 수 있는 잠수함까지 보유하고 있는 북한은 한국 뿐만 아니라 일본, 중국, 미국 등에 커다란 위협으로 등장하고 있다.
북한의 핵보유를 가능케 한 요인들
북핵 문제에 어떻게 대응하고 그 것을 해결할 것인가? 북한이 지금의 핵 능력을 보유하게 된 데는 다음과 같은 요인들의 도움을 받았다고 하겠다.
1. 미국이 2003년 이래 이라크, 아프가니스탄, 시리아 등 중, 근동 문제에 몰두하였던 점.
2. 미국의 대북핵 정책이 온건, 강경을 왕래하면서 일관성을 결여하였던 점.
3. 미국과 주요국가들이 핵을 보유하는 북한보다 핵 프로그램을 시작하는 이란에 더 많은 관심과 노력을 집중시킨 점.
4. 중국이 북한의 핵 보유를 반대하면서도 북한의 반발과 붕괴를 피하기 위해 미온적인 정책을 펴 왔던 점.
5. 한국이 “햇볓정책”을 통하여 북한에 핵 개발에 필요한 금융자산을 제공한 점.
6. 북한의 “벼랑끝 전술”이 유효했던 점 등이다.
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북핵
이렇듯 전문가들에 의하면 북한이 핵무장에 있어서 “돌이킬 수 없는 지점”까지 와 있다는 점에 비추어 한국은 물론 미국과 중국 등은 “전략적 인내” (strategic patience) 등 소극적인 정책에서 벗어나 좀더 적극적이고 집중적인 대처를 할 시점에 와 있는 것이다. 지난 10여년간 미국을 비롯한 각국은 북한의 핵개발과 위협에 대해 다음과 같은 대응책을 추구해 왔다.
1. 북한이 추가 핵 실험을 못하도록 압력을 가하는 것. 이 정책은 북한이 4차 실험을 행함으로써 다시 한번 실패한 것으로 판명 되었다.
2. 북한이 6자회담과 같은 협상장으로 나오게 하는 것.
3. 핵실험, 장거리 미사일 실험 등에 대해 유엔 안보리의 제재를 부과하는 것. 일본 등은 추가로 독자적인 제재도 실시하였다.
4. 유엔 제재 이외의 추가 제재를 위협하는 것.
5. 경제지원, 안전 보장 등 당근 (유인책)을 제시하는 것.
그러나 지금까지 이들 중 어느 방안도 효과를 본 것이 없다. 북한의 핵 무력은 능력과 수량 면에서 계속 증대되고 있고, 이를 유지 강화시키겠다는 북한의 의지도 계속 강화되는 상황이다.
2015년 4월 체결된 이란과의 핵협상 타결 합의 (Iran nuclear deal)는 북핵 문제와 관련하여 어떠한 의미를 갖는가? '이란 딜'은 안보리 5개 상임이사국 (미국, 영국, 프랑스, 러시아, 중국)과 독일 (5 + 1)이 이란에 대한 제재를 해제하는 대신 이란이 최소한 10년간 핵 활동을 중지하겠다고 약속한 합의이다. 미국은 이란이 아직 본격적으로 핵무기 생산에 들어선 것도 아닌데 그 나라의 지정학적 중요성, 석유생산국으로서의 중요성, 중동에서의 위치 등에 비추어 이란핵 문제가 북핵문제보다 더 심각한 것으로 간주했다. 마침 이란이 협상의 용의를 표명하고 러시아, 중국 및 기타 안보리 상임이사국들과 독일의 협조를 받아 이스라엘, 사우디 아라비아 등의 반대에도 불구하고 합의에 성공한 사례이다.
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북핵
북한과의 협상은 강력한 제재 시행 후에 가능
북핵 문제와 비교해 볼 때, 이란은 아직 핵무기를 확보한 상태가 아니었고, 석유라는 자원을 갖고 있고, 중산층을 갖고 있고, 비교적 합리적인 판단을 할 수 있는 리더쉽을 갖고 있다는 점에서 북한과 다르다고 하겠다. 그러나 북한도 이란과 같이 경제를 개선하고 발전시키겠다는 욕망은 갖고 있다. 동시에 북핵의 경우 그것의 협상에 의한 해결을 강력히 반대하는 미국의 우방—이스라엘, 사우디 아라비아 등 – 이 없는 점은 협상을 위해 좀 더 유리한 면이라고 하겠다. 이러한 점에서 볼 때 앞으로 어떠한 시점, 북한이 4차 핵실험을 한 현재는 아니고 유엔 안보리 등의 강력한 제재로 그 아픔을 뼈저리게 느끼게 될 때, 한국, 미국 등은 6자회담 등을 통하여 북한과 본격적인 협상을 추진해 볼 수 있을 것이다.
북핵의 근본 해결은 통일
북핵의 근본적이고 완전한 해결을 이루기 위해서는 한반도의 통일이 그 완전한 방법이고 첩경이라고 하겠다. 이 것이 미국은 물론 중국, 일본 등 여타 국가들도 한국의 통일을 지지해 주어야 할 중요한 이유중의 하나다. 그러나 통일이 오기까지 시간이 걸린다면 그 동안 국제사회는 강력한 제재를 부과함으로써 북한의 핵정책 변경을 유도하고 정권 자체의 변화까지 가져올 수 있는 방법을 강구해야 할 것이다.
< 다음은 영문판입니다 >
Nuclear North Korea: A Reassessment*
On January 6th, North Korea detonated its fourth nuclear bomb and claimed that it was a hydrogen bomb. It infuriated not only South Korea, Japan, and the United States, but also China which until then had been reluctant to exercise blatant pressure on North Korea to denuclearize. The fourth nuclear test in 10 years since its first test in 2006, whether it is indeed a hydrogen bomb or a boosted fission bomb as many in the outside suspect, also prompted the UN Security Council to decide a harsher and more biting sanctions than before on North Korea.
In conducting the nuclear bomb test, North Korea asserted that it was doing it in order to defend itself from and deter the U.S. threat and aggression against the DPRK. Kim Jong Un, the young North Korean leader, who supposedly ordered the bomb test, probably had other objectives as well. One was related to domestic politics. The test, coming only two days before his birthday celebration, was intended to demonstrate his bravado and achievement to the population, who still have much reservation about the leadership qualities. He also wanted to demonstrate that North Korea is a credible threat to the United States and therefore has to be reckoned with as such. Inasmuch as China had been leaning heavily to keep it from conducting the fourth test, Kim Jong Un, by defying its pressure, wanted to send a strong message to China that he could not and would not knuckle under Chinese pressure. Despite the cost the test would incur, Kim Jong Un also wanted to use the nuclear test as a means to obtain recognition by the international community that Pyongyang was indeed a nuclear weapons power. The proud announcement of the “successful” test was accompanied by the vow that North Korea would never, never give up its nuclear weapons under any circumstances (“even if the heaven tumbles down”)
How did we come to this situation? Some 23 years ago, on March 12, 1993, North Korea declared that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and precipitated the first North Korean nuclear crisis. I had just assumed the post of South Korean Foreign Minister and was charged with the task of working with the United States to bring North Korea back into the NPT fold and put a halt on its nuclear activity. Nineteen months later, we managed to sign the Geneva Agreed Framework (AF), which froze the North Korean nuclear program and reinstituted an IAEA inspection regime in exchange for two 2,000 megawatt Light Water Reactors (LWRs), upon completion of which North Korea promised to dismantle all its nuclear facilities and program.
The agreement had both merits and demerits. Critics were quick to note that the agreement allowed at least several years to pass before the IAEA could conduct the “special inspection” of the undeclared nuclear waste site. What’s more, the agreement “rewarded” North Korea with benefits such as energy supply and light water reactors for its defiance of the IAEA. But considering that it was the special inspection issue that prompted the controversy between Pyongyang and the IAEA, it was not surprising that the Agreed Framework was criticized for failing to accomplish an early “special inspection.”
On the positive side, the agreement put an end to the crisis situation which could have brought about a destructive military clash. It also succeeded in freezing the North Korean nuclear program and activities for 8 years, in effect removing the possibility of its engaging in a plutonium-based nuclear weapons development program. Finally, it gave North Korea a stake in implementing the agreement. The prospect of receiving heavy oil and securing light water reactors gave Pyongyang an incentive to “behave,” at least for a while.
In the meantime, North Korea kept its nuclear program frozen, allowed the IAEA continued inspection of its nuclear facilities, and had the withdrawn fuel rods encased for safe-keeping. The agreement also induced Pyongyang to participate in the four-party talks (of the United States, China, and North and South Korea) which began in December 1997 after much hesitation. There was no question that the relatively restrained behavior of North Korea until 2002 could be attributed to the Geneva agreement with the United States.
However, ten years later in 2003, the AF was abrogated as North Korea started its highly enriched uranium enrichment program (UEP) to build nuclear weapons and restarted its nuclear program openly and actively. After another decade of on-again-and-off again negotiations, North Korea became a self-declared nuclear weapons state with nearly 20 nuclear weapons and with the possibility of possessing anywhere between 50 to 100 nuclear weapons by the year 2020, according to experts in the United States, particularly of an institution based in Washington, DC called 38 North. North Korea has not only proclaimed that it is a nuclear weapons state but also inscribed such a status in the preamble of its Constitution. Today, Pyongyang is propagating what it calls “the policy for parallel development of nuclear weapons and of economy.” Combined with its ballistic missile capability ranging from several hundred to several thousand kilometers and SLBMs (submarine launched ballistic missiles), North Korea’s nuclear weapons pose a threat not only on South Korea but on all its neighboring countries including Japan, China, and even the United States.
Then what went wrong? How can we cope with the threat and the problem?
First, we might ask whether the Geneva Agreed Framework of 1994 was a failure? North Korea cheated by clandestinely starting a uranium enrichment program. Was it because the agreement was at fault? We do not know if North Korea, when it signed the 1994 Agreed Framework, planned to have a clandestine nuclear program later. What we know is that, around 1997-8, when the time was nearing for it to dismantle its nuclear facilities under the agreement, it found an opportunity (by way of A. Q. Khan of Pakistan) to engage in a nuclear program through the HEU (highly enriched uranium) route. Then in 2002-3, it also found the opportunity and excuse to scrap the agreement and openly restart the nuclear program. Since resuming its nuclear activity in earnest in 2003, North Korea made much progress in developing nuclear bombs, making its first test in 2006, second in 2009 and third in 2013. It is estimated that North Korea would have nearly 20 nuclear bombs by the end of last year (2015). In becoming a bona fide nuclear weapons state, North Korea has taken advantage of the United States being bogged down in the Middle East, oscillation of U.S. policies, disarray among the regional countries, and its brinkmanship attitude that defied risks and dangers. It also made use of China's rather lukewarm attitude toward it, which was the result of China's reluctance to push North Korea too far for fear of backlashes and possible collapse. Ten years (1999--2008) of South Korea's indulgent sunshine policy toward the North also helped North Korea to secure a large part of the financing that was needed to develop nuclear weapons. North Korea probably would have developed nuclear weapons anyway regardless of what we had done or not. Nonetheless, criticism is there: that, over the years, we should have done this and that or we shouldn’t have done this and that.
These are what critics say about what we should have done:
1. We should have used force, like bombing North Korea before it crossed the “threshold” (i.e., entering the “zone of immunity”—cf. Israel’s Netanyahu.)
2. We should have insisted on a more effective verification regime. The problem was not so much that it was a bad deal as it was a good agreement, putting a lid on North Korea’s nuclear activity. North Korea decided to cheat and engage in a clandestine program anyway. They argue that we should have at least used more sticks than carrots.
3. Some on the opposite side argue that we should have built the LWRs on schedule to hasten North Korea’s dismantling process of its nuclear facilities.
4. The major powers, especially the United States should have given nuclear North Korea at least as much attention and urgency as they have given to the Iranian nuclear issue.
5. We should have given North Korea a stronger security assurance.
What we should not have done lies mostly on the reverse side of what should have been done:
1. We should not have assumed that the North Korean regime could collapse soon and thereby letting North Korea off the hook rather easily.
2. We should not have agreed to build the LWRs, which are not proliferation resistant anyway. We should not have “bought the same horse twice and thrice” or rewarded bad behavior.
3. We should not have negotiated with North Korea, period (cf. Cheney, Rumsfeld)
4. South Korea should not have, through its “Sunshine Policy”, provided North Korea with financial resources to support the North Korean nuclear development program.
5. The other members of the Six Party Talks than North Korea, especially the United States and South Korea, should not have ruled out the possibility of a regime change in that country for denuclearizing it.
There seems to be some consensus among international experts and/or observers on the following points regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program:
1. North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons program no matter what happens. There is no carrot that will induce, no stick that will force North Korea to give up nuclear weapons or the development thereof.
2. Libya, Iraq, and Ukraine made North Korea even more resolved to keep the program.
3. The only country that can influence North Korea is China.
4. The only way to denuclearize North Korea may be through regime collapse or change. However, since even regime change (a la South Africa) may not lead North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, the best way could be reunification under the South Korean auspices.
5. The best we can do for the time being is to put a lid, keep it from further testing, and keep the pressure (mostly sanctions) on.
In my view, however, there are two cases which inadvertently and perhaps ironically contributed to North Korea’s march toward becoming a nuclear weapons state. One is the 1992 attempt to force a special inspection of North Korea after the IAEA discovery of the “discrepancy” between the amount of plutonium it admitted to have processed and the amount the IAEA suspected North Korea had produced. The other was the 2002 attempt to probe the North Korean UEP after discovering that North Korea was engaged in that program. The first case is where we placed more emphasis on the past activity rather than on maintaining the current inspection regime of North Korean nuclear activities. The second is where we focused more on the future of North Korean nuclear activity than on maintaining the present system of curtailing it. What I am saying is that, without ignoring or tolerating their past or future infringements, we could have handled the cases differently than we actually did. In 1992, perhaps we insisted a little too much on “special inspection”––aimed at clarifying the “discrepancy” regarding the amount of plutonium North Korea presumably had extracted from its nuclear spent fuel. In 2002, we could have handled the UEP issue with North Korea without dismantling the Geneva accord instead of the North Korean nuclear facilities.
The critical strategic question in 1992 was whether to make North Korea stay with the NPT while seeking for clarification of the “discrepancy” or allow it an excuse to withdraw from the NPT itself. The former would have been more for the present and future, and the latter was placing the present and future at risk in order to probe the past. The former approach would have been for practicality and the latter for principle. In 2002, it was whether we should keep the Geneva accord and work for preventing North Korea’s further work in its UEP or we should let the Agreed Framework collapse in the interest of probing the UEP. Again, the former would have been going for practicality and latter for principle. The former would have been for the present while the latter was more for the future.
Under the circumstances, I would like to emphasize seven points in handling the North Korean nuclear issue.
1. Pragmatic and strategic goals are more important than principles or ideologies.
2. If it is not a surrender agreement, give-and-take arrangements are important. We need to give the other side a stake in implementing the agreement.
3. We need both carrots and sticks, and need to integrate them judiciously.
4. Negotiated arrangements are better than other options such as sanctions or physical means. Sanctions should be used to promote and facilitate negotiation.
5. Even half a loaf is better than no loaf at all.
6. We have to stop the other side’s nuclear program before reversing it.
7. Short of a military defeat or a regime change, we cannot seek a clean, sweeping solution such as complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID), but take practical and feasible, yet urgent and necessary steps must be taken to reverse the increase in North Korean nuclear arsenal.
With the aforementioned observations, let me turn to the present and the future.
Regarding the six-party talks, it seems that China, and to some extent South Korea, seem to be the only parties which still would like to see the process resumed. North Korea, which previously indicated its willingness to return to the talks without preconditions, seems to have lost interest in them. The United States has a precondition: North Korea should take a credible action to prove that it will denuclearize and take a practical step toward denuclearization. The rationale for this precondition is understandable. Initially, President Obama was hopeful that he could reach an agreement with North Korea by "extending a hand" to it. But the overture was quickly rejected by the North, which thereafter conducted a nuclear bomb test and launched ballistic missiles. Hence, since the spring of 2009, the Obama Administration has been taking a rather hard line toward North Korea. It is now saying that the six-party talks cannot be resumed as if nothing had happened during the past several years, especially since 2005, when the agreement was reached on North Korean denuclearization between North Korea and the rest of the six-party talks; namely, the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea.
During the past seven years of no six-party talks, North Korea conducted nuclear tests, fired ballistic missiles, and demonstrated the UEP and even an SLBM capable of launching ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads from under the water. According to the United States, as a matter of principle, North Korea should take a sincere step toward denuclearization before talks can be resumed. Whenever there is a sign from the United States and/or South Korea relaxing or modifying their preconditions for six-party talks, objections are raised arguing that it could send North Korea a “wrong signal,” the signal that may enable North Korea to violate agreements with impunity. Now that North Korea has conducted its fourth nuclear test, the chances of resuming the Six Party Talks have become even more remote.
North Korea’s nuclear program and the erratic, unpredictable behavior of its new leader, Kim Jong Un, present a peculiar dilemma to South Korea and its neighbors. Thus far, the reactions from the powers concerned to the North Korean nuclear threat seem to boil down to the following five strategies:
1. to pressure North Korea not to conduct more nuclear or missile tests (which failed to keep North Korea from conducting the fourth test).
2. to bring North Korea to a negotiating table such as the six-party talks;
3. to threaten with tougher and more stringent economic sanctions by the UN Security Council against Pyongyang’s tests of nuclear weapons or long-range missiles;
4. to threaten with punishments beyond UN sanctions; and
5. to offer inducements such as economic assistance and security guarantee in case North Korea suspends its nuclear weapons program.
Up until now, none of these measures have shown to be effective in reducing, much less stopping, the North Korean nuclear activities. Instead, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is looking increasingly more dangerous in terms of magnitude and capabilities. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are dangerous not only to South Korea but to all of the regional countries including China and Japan. Thus, it may now be the time for the United States and others to reexamine their “strategic patience” approach, which is tantamount to a recipe for inaction. The Iranian nuclear deal of last year (2015) should encourage us to try to persuade North Korea into stopping its nuclear program and reverse the course. Are there any lessons that we can draw from the Iranian nuclear deal of last year? Iran decided to give up its nuclear weapons program in the face of sanctions that go beyond the UN-imposed ones. There were close coordination and consultation among the major powers (5+1 - five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany). Iran had a dire need to see the economic sanctions lifted and to revive its sagging economy. To be sure, North Korea is different from Iran in that it already has nuclear weapons while Iran was yet to operate its program. North Korea has no strategic commodity such as oil it can sell whereas Iran does. But on one point they share a common aspiration -- to improve their economic situation in the face of restlessness among their people.
The outside world can make use of North Korea’s desire to do business with it while holding out the carrot that offers opportunities to improve its economy in exchange for accommodating on the nuclear issue. The United States and South Korea should seek to cooperate and coordinate with the rest of powers concerned, i.e., China, Russia, and Japan, to work for rolling back the North Korean nuclear program even though, if indeed North Korea is successful with its hydrogen bomb program, the price of suspending its nuclear program will get much higher. However, failing to limit the DPRK’s nuclear development now means that its program will only get exponentially more dangerous in the years to come.
One sure way to achieve denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula including North Korea is reunification under the South Korean auspices. Although this, if it ever happens, is a long-term prospect, as the North Korean nuclear program is a major concern and source of threat to all the neighboring countries and the United States, the consequent removal of the problem will be one good reason why they should welcome Korean unification and support its realization. North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, whether it is of thermonuclear or boosted fission variety, presents both the need and opportunity for South Korea, together with the United States and other countries, to seek a different but more effective way of dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat. With radically increasing pressure on North Korea with stronger sanctions, they can seek to change its nuclear policy while at the same time causing a regime change in North Korea that can be a short-cut to resolution of its nuclear problem. (January 07, 2016)
* Speech to be given at the General Meeting of the Korean-American Association, in Seoul, Korea, on January 8th, 2016.
[한승주 고려대학교 명예교수, 전 외무부장관]
1월 6일 북한은 4차 핵실험을 감행하고 소형의 수소탄 시험에 성공했다고 발표했다. 그것은 한국, 미국, 일본뿐 아니라 중국, 러시아까지도 경악하고 분개하게 만들었다. 유엔 안보리는 지금까지의 제재보다도 더 강력하고 중대한 추가 제재를 부과하기로 합의했다. 북한은 자신의 핵무기 개발과 핵실험이 미국의 위협과 압박에 대항하기 위한 것이라고 주장했다. 그러나 이번 핵실험은(그것이 수소탄이건, 증폭핵분열탄이건 간에) 다음의 목적이 있었던 것으로 보인다.
북한의 핵실험 목적
1. 김정은의 생일 이틀 전, 또 5월의 7차 노동당 대회를 앞둔 시점이라는 점에서 김정은의 흔들리는 국내정치적 위상을 높이고 그의 “업적”을 과시하기 위한 것.
2. 북한이 미국을 위협할 수 있는 핵 능력을 가졌다는 것을 과시함으로써 미국의 관심을 모으고 미국과 협상의 발판을 마련하기 위한 것.
3. 중국이 북한에 대하여 4차 핵실험을 하지 말라는 압력을 가하는데 대하여 중국에게 굴종하지 않겠다는 결의를 보이기 위한 것.
4. 국제 사회로부터 북한이 핵 보유국이라는 공식 인정을 받기 위한 것.
5. 북한은 절대로 핵을 포기하지 않겠다는 의지를 강조하기 위한 것 등이라고 하겠다.
북핵북핵 문제가 어떻게 이러한 상황에 이르게 되었는가? 혹자는 1차 핵문제가 야기된 1993년 미국이 제네바 합의 (Geneva Agreed Framework)를 체결함으로써 북한에게 핵무기를 생산하고 보유할 빌미와 기회를 주었다고 주장한다. 그러나 제네바 합의는 북한의 핵활동을 동결시켰고 그 대가로 받는 경수로가 완성되는 시점에 북한이 모든 핵 시설을 폐기하고 핵 프로그램을 중단하는 것을 규정하였다. 제네바 합의가 2003년 폐지된 것은 북한이 1990년대 말부터 비밀리에 농축우라늄 프로그램을 시작하여 합의를 위반했기 때문이었다. 2003년 공개적으로 핵 활동을 재개한 북한은 6자회담을 통한 협상을 간헐적으로 진행하는 한편 핵무기 개발에 박차를 가하여 2005년 말까지는 두 가지 방법 (플루토니움과 농축 우라니움)을 통해 추산하여 20여개의 핵 폭탄을 보유하게 되었다. 워싱턴에 소재한 38 North라는 기관에 의하면 북한은 2020년 까지는 50 내지 100개의 핵폭탄을 갖게 될 것이라고 한다. 북한은 자신이 명실상부한 핵 보유국이라고 주장하는 한편 2012년 그것을 헌법 서문에 명기했다. 2013년 북한은 핵실험으로 인한 유엔의 제재를 받고 있음에도 불구하고 경제와 핵 무력을 동시에 추구하는 “병진정책”을 채택하였다. 이렇듯 핵 탄두를 운반, 발사할 수 있는 장, 단거리 미사일과 잠수함발사 탄도 유도탄(Submarine-launched ballistic missile, SLBM)을 적재할 수 있는 잠수함까지 보유하고 있는 북한은 한국 뿐만 아니라 일본, 중국, 미국 등에 커다란 위협으로 등장하고 있다.
북한의 핵보유를 가능케 한 요인들
북핵 문제에 어떻게 대응하고 그 것을 해결할 것인가? 북한이 지금의 핵 능력을 보유하게 된 데는 다음과 같은 요인들의 도움을 받았다고 하겠다.
1. 미국이 2003년 이래 이라크, 아프가니스탄, 시리아 등 중, 근동 문제에 몰두하였던 점.
2. 미국의 대북핵 정책이 온건, 강경을 왕래하면서 일관성을 결여하였던 점.
3. 미국과 주요국가들이 핵을 보유하는 북한보다 핵 프로그램을 시작하는 이란에 더 많은 관심과 노력을 집중시킨 점.
4. 중국이 북한의 핵 보유를 반대하면서도 북한의 반발과 붕괴를 피하기 위해 미온적인 정책을 펴 왔던 점.
5. 한국이 “햇볓정책”을 통하여 북한에 핵 개발에 필요한 금융자산을 제공한 점.
6. 북한의 “벼랑끝 전술”이 유효했던 점 등이다.
북핵이렇듯 전문가들에 의하면 북한이 핵무장에 있어서 “돌이킬 수 없는 지점”까지 와 있다는 점에 비추어 한국은 물론 미국과 중국 등은 “전략적 인내” (strategic patience) 등 소극적인 정책에서 벗어나 좀더 적극적이고 집중적인 대처를 할 시점에 와 있는 것이다. 지난 10여년간 미국을 비롯한 각국은 북한의 핵개발과 위협에 대해 다음과 같은 대응책을 추구해 왔다.
1. 북한이 추가 핵 실험을 못하도록 압력을 가하는 것. 이 정책은 북한이 4차 실험을 행함으로써 다시 한번 실패한 것으로 판명 되었다.
2. 북한이 6자회담과 같은 협상장으로 나오게 하는 것.
3. 핵실험, 장거리 미사일 실험 등에 대해 유엔 안보리의 제재를 부과하는 것. 일본 등은 추가로 독자적인 제재도 실시하였다.
4. 유엔 제재 이외의 추가 제재를 위협하는 것.
5. 경제지원, 안전 보장 등 당근 (유인책)을 제시하는 것.
그러나 지금까지 이들 중 어느 방안도 효과를 본 것이 없다. 북한의 핵 무력은 능력과 수량 면에서 계속 증대되고 있고, 이를 유지 강화시키겠다는 북한의 의지도 계속 강화되는 상황이다.
2015년 4월 체결된 이란과의 핵협상 타결 합의 (Iran nuclear deal)는 북핵 문제와 관련하여 어떠한 의미를 갖는가? '이란 딜'은 안보리 5개 상임이사국 (미국, 영국, 프랑스, 러시아, 중국)과 독일 (5 + 1)이 이란에 대한 제재를 해제하는 대신 이란이 최소한 10년간 핵 활동을 중지하겠다고 약속한 합의이다. 미국은 이란이 아직 본격적으로 핵무기 생산에 들어선 것도 아닌데 그 나라의 지정학적 중요성, 석유생산국으로서의 중요성, 중동에서의 위치 등에 비추어 이란핵 문제가 북핵문제보다 더 심각한 것으로 간주했다. 마침 이란이 협상의 용의를 표명하고 러시아, 중국 및 기타 안보리 상임이사국들과 독일의 협조를 받아 이스라엘, 사우디 아라비아 등의 반대에도 불구하고 합의에 성공한 사례이다.
북핵북한과의 협상은 강력한 제재 시행 후에 가능
북핵 문제와 비교해 볼 때, 이란은 아직 핵무기를 확보한 상태가 아니었고, 석유라는 자원을 갖고 있고, 중산층을 갖고 있고, 비교적 합리적인 판단을 할 수 있는 리더쉽을 갖고 있다는 점에서 북한과 다르다고 하겠다. 그러나 북한도 이란과 같이 경제를 개선하고 발전시키겠다는 욕망은 갖고 있다. 동시에 북핵의 경우 그것의 협상에 의한 해결을 강력히 반대하는 미국의 우방—이스라엘, 사우디 아라비아 등 – 이 없는 점은 협상을 위해 좀 더 유리한 면이라고 하겠다. 이러한 점에서 볼 때 앞으로 어떠한 시점, 북한이 4차 핵실험을 한 현재는 아니고 유엔 안보리 등의 강력한 제재로 그 아픔을 뼈저리게 느끼게 될 때, 한국, 미국 등은 6자회담 등을 통하여 북한과 본격적인 협상을 추진해 볼 수 있을 것이다.
북핵의 근본 해결은 통일
북핵의 근본적이고 완전한 해결을 이루기 위해서는 한반도의 통일이 그 완전한 방법이고 첩경이라고 하겠다. 이 것이 미국은 물론 중국, 일본 등 여타 국가들도 한국의 통일을 지지해 주어야 할 중요한 이유중의 하나다. 그러나 통일이 오기까지 시간이 걸린다면 그 동안 국제사회는 강력한 제재를 부과함으로써 북한의 핵정책 변경을 유도하고 정권 자체의 변화까지 가져올 수 있는 방법을 강구해야 할 것이다.
< 다음은 영문판입니다 >
Nuclear North Korea: A Reassessment*
On January 6th, North Korea detonated its fourth nuclear bomb and claimed that it was a hydrogen bomb. It infuriated not only South Korea, Japan, and the United States, but also China which until then had been reluctant to exercise blatant pressure on North Korea to denuclearize. The fourth nuclear test in 10 years since its first test in 2006, whether it is indeed a hydrogen bomb or a boosted fission bomb as many in the outside suspect, also prompted the UN Security Council to decide a harsher and more biting sanctions than before on North Korea.
In conducting the nuclear bomb test, North Korea asserted that it was doing it in order to defend itself from and deter the U.S. threat and aggression against the DPRK. Kim Jong Un, the young North Korean leader, who supposedly ordered the bomb test, probably had other objectives as well. One was related to domestic politics. The test, coming only two days before his birthday celebration, was intended to demonstrate his bravado and achievement to the population, who still have much reservation about the leadership qualities. He also wanted to demonstrate that North Korea is a credible threat to the United States and therefore has to be reckoned with as such. Inasmuch as China had been leaning heavily to keep it from conducting the fourth test, Kim Jong Un, by defying its pressure, wanted to send a strong message to China that he could not and would not knuckle under Chinese pressure. Despite the cost the test would incur, Kim Jong Un also wanted to use the nuclear test as a means to obtain recognition by the international community that Pyongyang was indeed a nuclear weapons power. The proud announcement of the “successful” test was accompanied by the vow that North Korea would never, never give up its nuclear weapons under any circumstances (“even if the heaven tumbles down”)
How did we come to this situation? Some 23 years ago, on March 12, 1993, North Korea declared that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and precipitated the first North Korean nuclear crisis. I had just assumed the post of South Korean Foreign Minister and was charged with the task of working with the United States to bring North Korea back into the NPT fold and put a halt on its nuclear activity. Nineteen months later, we managed to sign the Geneva Agreed Framework (AF), which froze the North Korean nuclear program and reinstituted an IAEA inspection regime in exchange for two 2,000 megawatt Light Water Reactors (LWRs), upon completion of which North Korea promised to dismantle all its nuclear facilities and program.
The agreement had both merits and demerits. Critics were quick to note that the agreement allowed at least several years to pass before the IAEA could conduct the “special inspection” of the undeclared nuclear waste site. What’s more, the agreement “rewarded” North Korea with benefits such as energy supply and light water reactors for its defiance of the IAEA. But considering that it was the special inspection issue that prompted the controversy between Pyongyang and the IAEA, it was not surprising that the Agreed Framework was criticized for failing to accomplish an early “special inspection.”
On the positive side, the agreement put an end to the crisis situation which could have brought about a destructive military clash. It also succeeded in freezing the North Korean nuclear program and activities for 8 years, in effect removing the possibility of its engaging in a plutonium-based nuclear weapons development program. Finally, it gave North Korea a stake in implementing the agreement. The prospect of receiving heavy oil and securing light water reactors gave Pyongyang an incentive to “behave,” at least for a while.
In the meantime, North Korea kept its nuclear program frozen, allowed the IAEA continued inspection of its nuclear facilities, and had the withdrawn fuel rods encased for safe-keeping. The agreement also induced Pyongyang to participate in the four-party talks (of the United States, China, and North and South Korea) which began in December 1997 after much hesitation. There was no question that the relatively restrained behavior of North Korea until 2002 could be attributed to the Geneva agreement with the United States.
However, ten years later in 2003, the AF was abrogated as North Korea started its highly enriched uranium enrichment program (UEP) to build nuclear weapons and restarted its nuclear program openly and actively. After another decade of on-again-and-off again negotiations, North Korea became a self-declared nuclear weapons state with nearly 20 nuclear weapons and with the possibility of possessing anywhere between 50 to 100 nuclear weapons by the year 2020, according to experts in the United States, particularly of an institution based in Washington, DC called 38 North. North Korea has not only proclaimed that it is a nuclear weapons state but also inscribed such a status in the preamble of its Constitution. Today, Pyongyang is propagating what it calls “the policy for parallel development of nuclear weapons and of economy.” Combined with its ballistic missile capability ranging from several hundred to several thousand kilometers and SLBMs (submarine launched ballistic missiles), North Korea’s nuclear weapons pose a threat not only on South Korea but on all its neighboring countries including Japan, China, and even the United States.
Then what went wrong? How can we cope with the threat and the problem?
First, we might ask whether the Geneva Agreed Framework of 1994 was a failure? North Korea cheated by clandestinely starting a uranium enrichment program. Was it because the agreement was at fault? We do not know if North Korea, when it signed the 1994 Agreed Framework, planned to have a clandestine nuclear program later. What we know is that, around 1997-8, when the time was nearing for it to dismantle its nuclear facilities under the agreement, it found an opportunity (by way of A. Q. Khan of Pakistan) to engage in a nuclear program through the HEU (highly enriched uranium) route. Then in 2002-3, it also found the opportunity and excuse to scrap the agreement and openly restart the nuclear program. Since resuming its nuclear activity in earnest in 2003, North Korea made much progress in developing nuclear bombs, making its first test in 2006, second in 2009 and third in 2013. It is estimated that North Korea would have nearly 20 nuclear bombs by the end of last year (2015). In becoming a bona fide nuclear weapons state, North Korea has taken advantage of the United States being bogged down in the Middle East, oscillation of U.S. policies, disarray among the regional countries, and its brinkmanship attitude that defied risks and dangers. It also made use of China's rather lukewarm attitude toward it, which was the result of China's reluctance to push North Korea too far for fear of backlashes and possible collapse. Ten years (1999--2008) of South Korea's indulgent sunshine policy toward the North also helped North Korea to secure a large part of the financing that was needed to develop nuclear weapons. North Korea probably would have developed nuclear weapons anyway regardless of what we had done or not. Nonetheless, criticism is there: that, over the years, we should have done this and that or we shouldn’t have done this and that.
These are what critics say about what we should have done:
1. We should have used force, like bombing North Korea before it crossed the “threshold” (i.e., entering the “zone of immunity”—cf. Israel’s Netanyahu.)
2. We should have insisted on a more effective verification regime. The problem was not so much that it was a bad deal as it was a good agreement, putting a lid on North Korea’s nuclear activity. North Korea decided to cheat and engage in a clandestine program anyway. They argue that we should have at least used more sticks than carrots.
3. Some on the opposite side argue that we should have built the LWRs on schedule to hasten North Korea’s dismantling process of its nuclear facilities.
4. The major powers, especially the United States should have given nuclear North Korea at least as much attention and urgency as they have given to the Iranian nuclear issue.
5. We should have given North Korea a stronger security assurance.
What we should not have done lies mostly on the reverse side of what should have been done:
1. We should not have assumed that the North Korean regime could collapse soon and thereby letting North Korea off the hook rather easily.
2. We should not have agreed to build the LWRs, which are not proliferation resistant anyway. We should not have “bought the same horse twice and thrice” or rewarded bad behavior.
3. We should not have negotiated with North Korea, period (cf. Cheney, Rumsfeld)
4. South Korea should not have, through its “Sunshine Policy”, provided North Korea with financial resources to support the North Korean nuclear development program.
5. The other members of the Six Party Talks than North Korea, especially the United States and South Korea, should not have ruled out the possibility of a regime change in that country for denuclearizing it.
There seems to be some consensus among international experts and/or observers on the following points regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program:
1. North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons program no matter what happens. There is no carrot that will induce, no stick that will force North Korea to give up nuclear weapons or the development thereof.
2. Libya, Iraq, and Ukraine made North Korea even more resolved to keep the program.
3. The only country that can influence North Korea is China.
4. The only way to denuclearize North Korea may be through regime collapse or change. However, since even regime change (a la South Africa) may not lead North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, the best way could be reunification under the South Korean auspices.
5. The best we can do for the time being is to put a lid, keep it from further testing, and keep the pressure (mostly sanctions) on.
In my view, however, there are two cases which inadvertently and perhaps ironically contributed to North Korea’s march toward becoming a nuclear weapons state. One is the 1992 attempt to force a special inspection of North Korea after the IAEA discovery of the “discrepancy” between the amount of plutonium it admitted to have processed and the amount the IAEA suspected North Korea had produced. The other was the 2002 attempt to probe the North Korean UEP after discovering that North Korea was engaged in that program. The first case is where we placed more emphasis on the past activity rather than on maintaining the current inspection regime of North Korean nuclear activities. The second is where we focused more on the future of North Korean nuclear activity than on maintaining the present system of curtailing it. What I am saying is that, without ignoring or tolerating their past or future infringements, we could have handled the cases differently than we actually did. In 1992, perhaps we insisted a little too much on “special inspection”––aimed at clarifying the “discrepancy” regarding the amount of plutonium North Korea presumably had extracted from its nuclear spent fuel. In 2002, we could have handled the UEP issue with North Korea without dismantling the Geneva accord instead of the North Korean nuclear facilities.
The critical strategic question in 1992 was whether to make North Korea stay with the NPT while seeking for clarification of the “discrepancy” or allow it an excuse to withdraw from the NPT itself. The former would have been more for the present and future, and the latter was placing the present and future at risk in order to probe the past. The former approach would have been for practicality and the latter for principle. In 2002, it was whether we should keep the Geneva accord and work for preventing North Korea’s further work in its UEP or we should let the Agreed Framework collapse in the interest of probing the UEP. Again, the former would have been going for practicality and latter for principle. The former would have been for the present while the latter was more for the future.
Under the circumstances, I would like to emphasize seven points in handling the North Korean nuclear issue.
1. Pragmatic and strategic goals are more important than principles or ideologies.
2. If it is not a surrender agreement, give-and-take arrangements are important. We need to give the other side a stake in implementing the agreement.
3. We need both carrots and sticks, and need to integrate them judiciously.
4. Negotiated arrangements are better than other options such as sanctions or physical means. Sanctions should be used to promote and facilitate negotiation.
5. Even half a loaf is better than no loaf at all.
6. We have to stop the other side’s nuclear program before reversing it.
7. Short of a military defeat or a regime change, we cannot seek a clean, sweeping solution such as complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID), but take practical and feasible, yet urgent and necessary steps must be taken to reverse the increase in North Korean nuclear arsenal.
With the aforementioned observations, let me turn to the present and the future.
Regarding the six-party talks, it seems that China, and to some extent South Korea, seem to be the only parties which still would like to see the process resumed. North Korea, which previously indicated its willingness to return to the talks without preconditions, seems to have lost interest in them. The United States has a precondition: North Korea should take a credible action to prove that it will denuclearize and take a practical step toward denuclearization. The rationale for this precondition is understandable. Initially, President Obama was hopeful that he could reach an agreement with North Korea by "extending a hand" to it. But the overture was quickly rejected by the North, which thereafter conducted a nuclear bomb test and launched ballistic missiles. Hence, since the spring of 2009, the Obama Administration has been taking a rather hard line toward North Korea. It is now saying that the six-party talks cannot be resumed as if nothing had happened during the past several years, especially since 2005, when the agreement was reached on North Korean denuclearization between North Korea and the rest of the six-party talks; namely, the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea.
During the past seven years of no six-party talks, North Korea conducted nuclear tests, fired ballistic missiles, and demonstrated the UEP and even an SLBM capable of launching ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads from under the water. According to the United States, as a matter of principle, North Korea should take a sincere step toward denuclearization before talks can be resumed. Whenever there is a sign from the United States and/or South Korea relaxing or modifying their preconditions for six-party talks, objections are raised arguing that it could send North Korea a “wrong signal,” the signal that may enable North Korea to violate agreements with impunity. Now that North Korea has conducted its fourth nuclear test, the chances of resuming the Six Party Talks have become even more remote.
North Korea’s nuclear program and the erratic, unpredictable behavior of its new leader, Kim Jong Un, present a peculiar dilemma to South Korea and its neighbors. Thus far, the reactions from the powers concerned to the North Korean nuclear threat seem to boil down to the following five strategies:
1. to pressure North Korea not to conduct more nuclear or missile tests (which failed to keep North Korea from conducting the fourth test).
2. to bring North Korea to a negotiating table such as the six-party talks;
3. to threaten with tougher and more stringent economic sanctions by the UN Security Council against Pyongyang’s tests of nuclear weapons or long-range missiles;
4. to threaten with punishments beyond UN sanctions; and
5. to offer inducements such as economic assistance and security guarantee in case North Korea suspends its nuclear weapons program.
Up until now, none of these measures have shown to be effective in reducing, much less stopping, the North Korean nuclear activities. Instead, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is looking increasingly more dangerous in terms of magnitude and capabilities. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are dangerous not only to South Korea but to all of the regional countries including China and Japan. Thus, it may now be the time for the United States and others to reexamine their “strategic patience” approach, which is tantamount to a recipe for inaction. The Iranian nuclear deal of last year (2015) should encourage us to try to persuade North Korea into stopping its nuclear program and reverse the course. Are there any lessons that we can draw from the Iranian nuclear deal of last year? Iran decided to give up its nuclear weapons program in the face of sanctions that go beyond the UN-imposed ones. There were close coordination and consultation among the major powers (5+1 - five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany). Iran had a dire need to see the economic sanctions lifted and to revive its sagging economy. To be sure, North Korea is different from Iran in that it already has nuclear weapons while Iran was yet to operate its program. North Korea has no strategic commodity such as oil it can sell whereas Iran does. But on one point they share a common aspiration -- to improve their economic situation in the face of restlessness among their people.
The outside world can make use of North Korea’s desire to do business with it while holding out the carrot that offers opportunities to improve its economy in exchange for accommodating on the nuclear issue. The United States and South Korea should seek to cooperate and coordinate with the rest of powers concerned, i.e., China, Russia, and Japan, to work for rolling back the North Korean nuclear program even though, if indeed North Korea is successful with its hydrogen bomb program, the price of suspending its nuclear program will get much higher. However, failing to limit the DPRK’s nuclear development now means that its program will only get exponentially more dangerous in the years to come.
One sure way to achieve denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula including North Korea is reunification under the South Korean auspices. Although this, if it ever happens, is a long-term prospect, as the North Korean nuclear program is a major concern and source of threat to all the neighboring countries and the United States, the consequent removal of the problem will be one good reason why they should welcome Korean unification and support its realization. North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, whether it is of thermonuclear or boosted fission variety, presents both the need and opportunity for South Korea, together with the United States and other countries, to seek a different but more effective way of dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat. With radically increasing pressure on North Korea with stronger sanctions, they can seek to change its nuclear policy while at the same time causing a regime change in North Korea that can be a short-cut to resolution of its nuclear problem. (January 07, 2016)
* Speech to be given at the General Meeting of the Korean-American Association, in Seoul, Korea, on January 8th, 2016.
[한승주 고려대학교 명예교수, 전 외무부장관]
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- [명사 현장 칼럼] 북핵문제의 재평가 (Nuclear North Korea: A Reassessment)
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- 입력 2016-01-08 18:35:48
- 수정2016-01-08 18:58:53
[한승주 고려대학교 명예교수, 전 외무부장관]
1월 6일 북한은 4차 핵실험을 감행하고 소형의 수소탄 시험에 성공했다고 발표했다. 그것은 한국, 미국, 일본뿐 아니라 중국, 러시아까지도 경악하고 분개하게 만들었다. 유엔 안보리는 지금까지의 제재보다도 더 강력하고 중대한 추가 제재를 부과하기로 합의했다. 북한은 자신의 핵무기 개발과 핵실험이 미국의 위협과 압박에 대항하기 위한 것이라고 주장했다. 그러나 이번 핵실험은(그것이 수소탄이건, 증폭핵분열탄이건 간에) 다음의 목적이 있었던 것으로 보인다.
북한의 핵실험 목적
1. 김정은의 생일 이틀 전, 또 5월의 7차 노동당 대회를 앞둔 시점이라는 점에서 김정은의 흔들리는 국내정치적 위상을 높이고 그의 “업적”을 과시하기 위한 것.
2. 북한이 미국을 위협할 수 있는 핵 능력을 가졌다는 것을 과시함으로써 미국의 관심을 모으고 미국과 협상의 발판을 마련하기 위한 것.
3. 중국이 북한에 대하여 4차 핵실험을 하지 말라는 압력을 가하는데 대하여 중국에게 굴종하지 않겠다는 결의를 보이기 위한 것.
4. 국제 사회로부터 북한이 핵 보유국이라는 공식 인정을 받기 위한 것.
5. 북한은 절대로 핵을 포기하지 않겠다는 의지를 강조하기 위한 것 등이라고 하겠다.
북핵 문제가 어떻게 이러한 상황에 이르게 되었는가? 혹자는 1차 핵문제가 야기된 1993년 미국이 제네바 합의 (Geneva Agreed Framework)를 체결함으로써 북한에게 핵무기를 생산하고 보유할 빌미와 기회를 주었다고 주장한다. 그러나 제네바 합의는 북한의 핵활동을 동결시켰고 그 대가로 받는 경수로가 완성되는 시점에 북한이 모든 핵 시설을 폐기하고 핵 프로그램을 중단하는 것을 규정하였다. 제네바 합의가 2003년 폐지된 것은 북한이 1990년대 말부터 비밀리에 농축우라늄 프로그램을 시작하여 합의를 위반했기 때문이었다. 2003년 공개적으로 핵 활동을 재개한 북한은 6자회담을 통한 협상을 간헐적으로 진행하는 한편 핵무기 개발에 박차를 가하여 2005년 말까지는 두 가지 방법 (플루토니움과 농축 우라니움)을 통해 추산하여 20여개의 핵 폭탄을 보유하게 되었다. 워싱턴에 소재한 38 North라는 기관에 의하면 북한은 2020년 까지는 50 내지 100개의 핵폭탄을 갖게 될 것이라고 한다. 북한은 자신이 명실상부한 핵 보유국이라고 주장하는 한편 2012년 그것을 헌법 서문에 명기했다. 2013년 북한은 핵실험으로 인한 유엔의 제재를 받고 있음에도 불구하고 경제와 핵 무력을 동시에 추구하는 “병진정책”을 채택하였다. 이렇듯 핵 탄두를 운반, 발사할 수 있는 장, 단거리 미사일과 잠수함발사 탄도 유도탄(Submarine-launched ballistic missile, SLBM)을 적재할 수 있는 잠수함까지 보유하고 있는 북한은 한국 뿐만 아니라 일본, 중국, 미국 등에 커다란 위협으로 등장하고 있다.
북한의 핵보유를 가능케 한 요인들
북핵 문제에 어떻게 대응하고 그 것을 해결할 것인가? 북한이 지금의 핵 능력을 보유하게 된 데는 다음과 같은 요인들의 도움을 받았다고 하겠다.
1. 미국이 2003년 이래 이라크, 아프가니스탄, 시리아 등 중, 근동 문제에 몰두하였던 점.
2. 미국의 대북핵 정책이 온건, 강경을 왕래하면서 일관성을 결여하였던 점.
3. 미국과 주요국가들이 핵을 보유하는 북한보다 핵 프로그램을 시작하는 이란에 더 많은 관심과 노력을 집중시킨 점.
4. 중국이 북한의 핵 보유를 반대하면서도 북한의 반발과 붕괴를 피하기 위해 미온적인 정책을 펴 왔던 점.
5. 한국이 “햇볓정책”을 통하여 북한에 핵 개발에 필요한 금융자산을 제공한 점.
6. 북한의 “벼랑끝 전술”이 유효했던 점 등이다.
이렇듯 전문가들에 의하면 북한이 핵무장에 있어서 “돌이킬 수 없는 지점”까지 와 있다는 점에 비추어 한국은 물론 미국과 중국 등은 “전략적 인내” (strategic patience) 등 소극적인 정책에서 벗어나 좀더 적극적이고 집중적인 대처를 할 시점에 와 있는 것이다. 지난 10여년간 미국을 비롯한 각국은 북한의 핵개발과 위협에 대해 다음과 같은 대응책을 추구해 왔다.
1. 북한이 추가 핵 실험을 못하도록 압력을 가하는 것. 이 정책은 북한이 4차 실험을 행함으로써 다시 한번 실패한 것으로 판명 되었다.
2. 북한이 6자회담과 같은 협상장으로 나오게 하는 것.
3. 핵실험, 장거리 미사일 실험 등에 대해 유엔 안보리의 제재를 부과하는 것. 일본 등은 추가로 독자적인 제재도 실시하였다.
4. 유엔 제재 이외의 추가 제재를 위협하는 것.
5. 경제지원, 안전 보장 등 당근 (유인책)을 제시하는 것.
그러나 지금까지 이들 중 어느 방안도 효과를 본 것이 없다. 북한의 핵 무력은 능력과 수량 면에서 계속 증대되고 있고, 이를 유지 강화시키겠다는 북한의 의지도 계속 강화되는 상황이다.
2015년 4월 체결된 이란과의 핵협상 타결 합의 (Iran nuclear deal)는 북핵 문제와 관련하여 어떠한 의미를 갖는가? '이란 딜'은 안보리 5개 상임이사국 (미국, 영국, 프랑스, 러시아, 중국)과 독일 (5 + 1)이 이란에 대한 제재를 해제하는 대신 이란이 최소한 10년간 핵 활동을 중지하겠다고 약속한 합의이다. 미국은 이란이 아직 본격적으로 핵무기 생산에 들어선 것도 아닌데 그 나라의 지정학적 중요성, 석유생산국으로서의 중요성, 중동에서의 위치 등에 비추어 이란핵 문제가 북핵문제보다 더 심각한 것으로 간주했다. 마침 이란이 협상의 용의를 표명하고 러시아, 중국 및 기타 안보리 상임이사국들과 독일의 협조를 받아 이스라엘, 사우디 아라비아 등의 반대에도 불구하고 합의에 성공한 사례이다.
북한과의 협상은 강력한 제재 시행 후에 가능
북핵 문제와 비교해 볼 때, 이란은 아직 핵무기를 확보한 상태가 아니었고, 석유라는 자원을 갖고 있고, 중산층을 갖고 있고, 비교적 합리적인 판단을 할 수 있는 리더쉽을 갖고 있다는 점에서 북한과 다르다고 하겠다. 그러나 북한도 이란과 같이 경제를 개선하고 발전시키겠다는 욕망은 갖고 있다. 동시에 북핵의 경우 그것의 협상에 의한 해결을 강력히 반대하는 미국의 우방—이스라엘, 사우디 아라비아 등 – 이 없는 점은 협상을 위해 좀 더 유리한 면이라고 하겠다. 이러한 점에서 볼 때 앞으로 어떠한 시점, 북한이 4차 핵실험을 한 현재는 아니고 유엔 안보리 등의 강력한 제재로 그 아픔을 뼈저리게 느끼게 될 때, 한국, 미국 등은 6자회담 등을 통하여 북한과 본격적인 협상을 추진해 볼 수 있을 것이다.
북핵의 근본 해결은 통일
북핵의 근본적이고 완전한 해결을 이루기 위해서는 한반도의 통일이 그 완전한 방법이고 첩경이라고 하겠다. 이 것이 미국은 물론 중국, 일본 등 여타 국가들도 한국의 통일을 지지해 주어야 할 중요한 이유중의 하나다. 그러나 통일이 오기까지 시간이 걸린다면 그 동안 국제사회는 강력한 제재를 부과함으로써 북한의 핵정책 변경을 유도하고 정권 자체의 변화까지 가져올 수 있는 방법을 강구해야 할 것이다.
< 다음은 영문판입니다 >
Nuclear North Korea: A Reassessment*
On January 6th, North Korea detonated its fourth nuclear bomb and claimed that it was a hydrogen bomb. It infuriated not only South Korea, Japan, and the United States, but also China which until then had been reluctant to exercise blatant pressure on North Korea to denuclearize. The fourth nuclear test in 10 years since its first test in 2006, whether it is indeed a hydrogen bomb or a boosted fission bomb as many in the outside suspect, also prompted the UN Security Council to decide a harsher and more biting sanctions than before on North Korea.
In conducting the nuclear bomb test, North Korea asserted that it was doing it in order to defend itself from and deter the U.S. threat and aggression against the DPRK. Kim Jong Un, the young North Korean leader, who supposedly ordered the bomb test, probably had other objectives as well. One was related to domestic politics. The test, coming only two days before his birthday celebration, was intended to demonstrate his bravado and achievement to the population, who still have much reservation about the leadership qualities. He also wanted to demonstrate that North Korea is a credible threat to the United States and therefore has to be reckoned with as such. Inasmuch as China had been leaning heavily to keep it from conducting the fourth test, Kim Jong Un, by defying its pressure, wanted to send a strong message to China that he could not and would not knuckle under Chinese pressure. Despite the cost the test would incur, Kim Jong Un also wanted to use the nuclear test as a means to obtain recognition by the international community that Pyongyang was indeed a nuclear weapons power. The proud announcement of the “successful” test was accompanied by the vow that North Korea would never, never give up its nuclear weapons under any circumstances (“even if the heaven tumbles down”)
How did we come to this situation? Some 23 years ago, on March 12, 1993, North Korea declared that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and precipitated the first North Korean nuclear crisis. I had just assumed the post of South Korean Foreign Minister and was charged with the task of working with the United States to bring North Korea back into the NPT fold and put a halt on its nuclear activity. Nineteen months later, we managed to sign the Geneva Agreed Framework (AF), which froze the North Korean nuclear program and reinstituted an IAEA inspection regime in exchange for two 2,000 megawatt Light Water Reactors (LWRs), upon completion of which North Korea promised to dismantle all its nuclear facilities and program.
The agreement had both merits and demerits. Critics were quick to note that the agreement allowed at least several years to pass before the IAEA could conduct the “special inspection” of the undeclared nuclear waste site. What’s more, the agreement “rewarded” North Korea with benefits such as energy supply and light water reactors for its defiance of the IAEA. But considering that it was the special inspection issue that prompted the controversy between Pyongyang and the IAEA, it was not surprising that the Agreed Framework was criticized for failing to accomplish an early “special inspection.”
On the positive side, the agreement put an end to the crisis situation which could have brought about a destructive military clash. It also succeeded in freezing the North Korean nuclear program and activities for 8 years, in effect removing the possibility of its engaging in a plutonium-based nuclear weapons development program. Finally, it gave North Korea a stake in implementing the agreement. The prospect of receiving heavy oil and securing light water reactors gave Pyongyang an incentive to “behave,” at least for a while.
In the meantime, North Korea kept its nuclear program frozen, allowed the IAEA continued inspection of its nuclear facilities, and had the withdrawn fuel rods encased for safe-keeping. The agreement also induced Pyongyang to participate in the four-party talks (of the United States, China, and North and South Korea) which began in December 1997 after much hesitation. There was no question that the relatively restrained behavior of North Korea until 2002 could be attributed to the Geneva agreement with the United States.
However, ten years later in 2003, the AF was abrogated as North Korea started its highly enriched uranium enrichment program (UEP) to build nuclear weapons and restarted its nuclear program openly and actively. After another decade of on-again-and-off again negotiations, North Korea became a self-declared nuclear weapons state with nearly 20 nuclear weapons and with the possibility of possessing anywhere between 50 to 100 nuclear weapons by the year 2020, according to experts in the United States, particularly of an institution based in Washington, DC called 38 North. North Korea has not only proclaimed that it is a nuclear weapons state but also inscribed such a status in the preamble of its Constitution. Today, Pyongyang is propagating what it calls “the policy for parallel development of nuclear weapons and of economy.” Combined with its ballistic missile capability ranging from several hundred to several thousand kilometers and SLBMs (submarine launched ballistic missiles), North Korea’s nuclear weapons pose a threat not only on South Korea but on all its neighboring countries including Japan, China, and even the United States.
Then what went wrong? How can we cope with the threat and the problem?
First, we might ask whether the Geneva Agreed Framework of 1994 was a failure? North Korea cheated by clandestinely starting a uranium enrichment program. Was it because the agreement was at fault? We do not know if North Korea, when it signed the 1994 Agreed Framework, planned to have a clandestine nuclear program later. What we know is that, around 1997-8, when the time was nearing for it to dismantle its nuclear facilities under the agreement, it found an opportunity (by way of A. Q. Khan of Pakistan) to engage in a nuclear program through the HEU (highly enriched uranium) route. Then in 2002-3, it also found the opportunity and excuse to scrap the agreement and openly restart the nuclear program. Since resuming its nuclear activity in earnest in 2003, North Korea made much progress in developing nuclear bombs, making its first test in 2006, second in 2009 and third in 2013. It is estimated that North Korea would have nearly 20 nuclear bombs by the end of last year (2015). In becoming a bona fide nuclear weapons state, North Korea has taken advantage of the United States being bogged down in the Middle East, oscillation of U.S. policies, disarray among the regional countries, and its brinkmanship attitude that defied risks and dangers. It also made use of China's rather lukewarm attitude toward it, which was the result of China's reluctance to push North Korea too far for fear of backlashes and possible collapse. Ten years (1999--2008) of South Korea's indulgent sunshine policy toward the North also helped North Korea to secure a large part of the financing that was needed to develop nuclear weapons. North Korea probably would have developed nuclear weapons anyway regardless of what we had done or not. Nonetheless, criticism is there: that, over the years, we should have done this and that or we shouldn’t have done this and that.
These are what critics say about what we should have done:
1. We should have used force, like bombing North Korea before it crossed the “threshold” (i.e., entering the “zone of immunity”—cf. Israel’s Netanyahu.)
2. We should have insisted on a more effective verification regime. The problem was not so much that it was a bad deal as it was a good agreement, putting a lid on North Korea’s nuclear activity. North Korea decided to cheat and engage in a clandestine program anyway. They argue that we should have at least used more sticks than carrots.
3. Some on the opposite side argue that we should have built the LWRs on schedule to hasten North Korea’s dismantling process of its nuclear facilities.
4. The major powers, especially the United States should have given nuclear North Korea at least as much attention and urgency as they have given to the Iranian nuclear issue.
5. We should have given North Korea a stronger security assurance.
What we should not have done lies mostly on the reverse side of what should have been done:
1. We should not have assumed that the North Korean regime could collapse soon and thereby letting North Korea off the hook rather easily.
2. We should not have agreed to build the LWRs, which are not proliferation resistant anyway. We should not have “bought the same horse twice and thrice” or rewarded bad behavior.
3. We should not have negotiated with North Korea, period (cf. Cheney, Rumsfeld)
4. South Korea should not have, through its “Sunshine Policy”, provided North Korea with financial resources to support the North Korean nuclear development program.
5. The other members of the Six Party Talks than North Korea, especially the United States and South Korea, should not have ruled out the possibility of a regime change in that country for denuclearizing it.
There seems to be some consensus among international experts and/or observers on the following points regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program:
1. North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons program no matter what happens. There is no carrot that will induce, no stick that will force North Korea to give up nuclear weapons or the development thereof.
2. Libya, Iraq, and Ukraine made North Korea even more resolved to keep the program.
3. The only country that can influence North Korea is China.
4. The only way to denuclearize North Korea may be through regime collapse or change. However, since even regime change (a la South Africa) may not lead North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, the best way could be reunification under the South Korean auspices.
5. The best we can do for the time being is to put a lid, keep it from further testing, and keep the pressure (mostly sanctions) on.
In my view, however, there are two cases which inadvertently and perhaps ironically contributed to North Korea’s march toward becoming a nuclear weapons state. One is the 1992 attempt to force a special inspection of North Korea after the IAEA discovery of the “discrepancy” between the amount of plutonium it admitted to have processed and the amount the IAEA suspected North Korea had produced. The other was the 2002 attempt to probe the North Korean UEP after discovering that North Korea was engaged in that program. The first case is where we placed more emphasis on the past activity rather than on maintaining the current inspection regime of North Korean nuclear activities. The second is where we focused more on the future of North Korean nuclear activity than on maintaining the present system of curtailing it. What I am saying is that, without ignoring or tolerating their past or future infringements, we could have handled the cases differently than we actually did. In 1992, perhaps we insisted a little too much on “special inspection”––aimed at clarifying the “discrepancy” regarding the amount of plutonium North Korea presumably had extracted from its nuclear spent fuel. In 2002, we could have handled the UEP issue with North Korea without dismantling the Geneva accord instead of the North Korean nuclear facilities.
The critical strategic question in 1992 was whether to make North Korea stay with the NPT while seeking for clarification of the “discrepancy” or allow it an excuse to withdraw from the NPT itself. The former would have been more for the present and future, and the latter was placing the present and future at risk in order to probe the past. The former approach would have been for practicality and the latter for principle. In 2002, it was whether we should keep the Geneva accord and work for preventing North Korea’s further work in its UEP or we should let the Agreed Framework collapse in the interest of probing the UEP. Again, the former would have been going for practicality and latter for principle. The former would have been for the present while the latter was more for the future.
Under the circumstances, I would like to emphasize seven points in handling the North Korean nuclear issue.
1. Pragmatic and strategic goals are more important than principles or ideologies.
2. If it is not a surrender agreement, give-and-take arrangements are important. We need to give the other side a stake in implementing the agreement.
3. We need both carrots and sticks, and need to integrate them judiciously.
4. Negotiated arrangements are better than other options such as sanctions or physical means. Sanctions should be used to promote and facilitate negotiation.
5. Even half a loaf is better than no loaf at all.
6. We have to stop the other side’s nuclear program before reversing it.
7. Short of a military defeat or a regime change, we cannot seek a clean, sweeping solution such as complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID), but take practical and feasible, yet urgent and necessary steps must be taken to reverse the increase in North Korean nuclear arsenal.
With the aforementioned observations, let me turn to the present and the future.
Regarding the six-party talks, it seems that China, and to some extent South Korea, seem to be the only parties which still would like to see the process resumed. North Korea, which previously indicated its willingness to return to the talks without preconditions, seems to have lost interest in them. The United States has a precondition: North Korea should take a credible action to prove that it will denuclearize and take a practical step toward denuclearization. The rationale for this precondition is understandable. Initially, President Obama was hopeful that he could reach an agreement with North Korea by "extending a hand" to it. But the overture was quickly rejected by the North, which thereafter conducted a nuclear bomb test and launched ballistic missiles. Hence, since the spring of 2009, the Obama Administration has been taking a rather hard line toward North Korea. It is now saying that the six-party talks cannot be resumed as if nothing had happened during the past several years, especially since 2005, when the agreement was reached on North Korean denuclearization between North Korea and the rest of the six-party talks; namely, the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea.
During the past seven years of no six-party talks, North Korea conducted nuclear tests, fired ballistic missiles, and demonstrated the UEP and even an SLBM capable of launching ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads from under the water. According to the United States, as a matter of principle, North Korea should take a sincere step toward denuclearization before talks can be resumed. Whenever there is a sign from the United States and/or South Korea relaxing or modifying their preconditions for six-party talks, objections are raised arguing that it could send North Korea a “wrong signal,” the signal that may enable North Korea to violate agreements with impunity. Now that North Korea has conducted its fourth nuclear test, the chances of resuming the Six Party Talks have become even more remote.
North Korea’s nuclear program and the erratic, unpredictable behavior of its new leader, Kim Jong Un, present a peculiar dilemma to South Korea and its neighbors. Thus far, the reactions from the powers concerned to the North Korean nuclear threat seem to boil down to the following five strategies:
1. to pressure North Korea not to conduct more nuclear or missile tests (which failed to keep North Korea from conducting the fourth test).
2. to bring North Korea to a negotiating table such as the six-party talks;
3. to threaten with tougher and more stringent economic sanctions by the UN Security Council against Pyongyang’s tests of nuclear weapons or long-range missiles;
4. to threaten with punishments beyond UN sanctions; and
5. to offer inducements such as economic assistance and security guarantee in case North Korea suspends its nuclear weapons program.
Up until now, none of these measures have shown to be effective in reducing, much less stopping, the North Korean nuclear activities. Instead, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is looking increasingly more dangerous in terms of magnitude and capabilities. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are dangerous not only to South Korea but to all of the regional countries including China and Japan. Thus, it may now be the time for the United States and others to reexamine their “strategic patience” approach, which is tantamount to a recipe for inaction. The Iranian nuclear deal of last year (2015) should encourage us to try to persuade North Korea into stopping its nuclear program and reverse the course. Are there any lessons that we can draw from the Iranian nuclear deal of last year? Iran decided to give up its nuclear weapons program in the face of sanctions that go beyond the UN-imposed ones. There were close coordination and consultation among the major powers (5+1 - five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany). Iran had a dire need to see the economic sanctions lifted and to revive its sagging economy. To be sure, North Korea is different from Iran in that it already has nuclear weapons while Iran was yet to operate its program. North Korea has no strategic commodity such as oil it can sell whereas Iran does. But on one point they share a common aspiration -- to improve their economic situation in the face of restlessness among their people.
The outside world can make use of North Korea’s desire to do business with it while holding out the carrot that offers opportunities to improve its economy in exchange for accommodating on the nuclear issue. The United States and South Korea should seek to cooperate and coordinate with the rest of powers concerned, i.e., China, Russia, and Japan, to work for rolling back the North Korean nuclear program even though, if indeed North Korea is successful with its hydrogen bomb program, the price of suspending its nuclear program will get much higher. However, failing to limit the DPRK’s nuclear development now means that its program will only get exponentially more dangerous in the years to come.
One sure way to achieve denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula including North Korea is reunification under the South Korean auspices. Although this, if it ever happens, is a long-term prospect, as the North Korean nuclear program is a major concern and source of threat to all the neighboring countries and the United States, the consequent removal of the problem will be one good reason why they should welcome Korean unification and support its realization. North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, whether it is of thermonuclear or boosted fission variety, presents both the need and opportunity for South Korea, together with the United States and other countries, to seek a different but more effective way of dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat. With radically increasing pressure on North Korea with stronger sanctions, they can seek to change its nuclear policy while at the same time causing a regime change in North Korea that can be a short-cut to resolution of its nuclear problem. (January 07, 2016)
* Speech to be given at the General Meeting of the Korean-American Association, in Seoul, Korea, on January 8th, 2016.
[한승주 고려대학교 명예교수, 전 외무부장관]
1월 6일 북한은 4차 핵실험을 감행하고 소형의 수소탄 시험에 성공했다고 발표했다. 그것은 한국, 미국, 일본뿐 아니라 중국, 러시아까지도 경악하고 분개하게 만들었다. 유엔 안보리는 지금까지의 제재보다도 더 강력하고 중대한 추가 제재를 부과하기로 합의했다. 북한은 자신의 핵무기 개발과 핵실험이 미국의 위협과 압박에 대항하기 위한 것이라고 주장했다. 그러나 이번 핵실험은(그것이 수소탄이건, 증폭핵분열탄이건 간에) 다음의 목적이 있었던 것으로 보인다.
북한의 핵실험 목적
1. 김정은의 생일 이틀 전, 또 5월의 7차 노동당 대회를 앞둔 시점이라는 점에서 김정은의 흔들리는 국내정치적 위상을 높이고 그의 “업적”을 과시하기 위한 것.
2. 북한이 미국을 위협할 수 있는 핵 능력을 가졌다는 것을 과시함으로써 미국의 관심을 모으고 미국과 협상의 발판을 마련하기 위한 것.
3. 중국이 북한에 대하여 4차 핵실험을 하지 말라는 압력을 가하는데 대하여 중국에게 굴종하지 않겠다는 결의를 보이기 위한 것.
4. 국제 사회로부터 북한이 핵 보유국이라는 공식 인정을 받기 위한 것.
5. 북한은 절대로 핵을 포기하지 않겠다는 의지를 강조하기 위한 것 등이라고 하겠다.
북핵 문제가 어떻게 이러한 상황에 이르게 되었는가? 혹자는 1차 핵문제가 야기된 1993년 미국이 제네바 합의 (Geneva Agreed Framework)를 체결함으로써 북한에게 핵무기를 생산하고 보유할 빌미와 기회를 주었다고 주장한다. 그러나 제네바 합의는 북한의 핵활동을 동결시켰고 그 대가로 받는 경수로가 완성되는 시점에 북한이 모든 핵 시설을 폐기하고 핵 프로그램을 중단하는 것을 규정하였다. 제네바 합의가 2003년 폐지된 것은 북한이 1990년대 말부터 비밀리에 농축우라늄 프로그램을 시작하여 합의를 위반했기 때문이었다. 2003년 공개적으로 핵 활동을 재개한 북한은 6자회담을 통한 협상을 간헐적으로 진행하는 한편 핵무기 개발에 박차를 가하여 2005년 말까지는 두 가지 방법 (플루토니움과 농축 우라니움)을 통해 추산하여 20여개의 핵 폭탄을 보유하게 되었다. 워싱턴에 소재한 38 North라는 기관에 의하면 북한은 2020년 까지는 50 내지 100개의 핵폭탄을 갖게 될 것이라고 한다. 북한은 자신이 명실상부한 핵 보유국이라고 주장하는 한편 2012년 그것을 헌법 서문에 명기했다. 2013년 북한은 핵실험으로 인한 유엔의 제재를 받고 있음에도 불구하고 경제와 핵 무력을 동시에 추구하는 “병진정책”을 채택하였다. 이렇듯 핵 탄두를 운반, 발사할 수 있는 장, 단거리 미사일과 잠수함발사 탄도 유도탄(Submarine-launched ballistic missile, SLBM)을 적재할 수 있는 잠수함까지 보유하고 있는 북한은 한국 뿐만 아니라 일본, 중국, 미국 등에 커다란 위협으로 등장하고 있다.
북한의 핵보유를 가능케 한 요인들
북핵 문제에 어떻게 대응하고 그 것을 해결할 것인가? 북한이 지금의 핵 능력을 보유하게 된 데는 다음과 같은 요인들의 도움을 받았다고 하겠다.
1. 미국이 2003년 이래 이라크, 아프가니스탄, 시리아 등 중, 근동 문제에 몰두하였던 점.
2. 미국의 대북핵 정책이 온건, 강경을 왕래하면서 일관성을 결여하였던 점.
3. 미국과 주요국가들이 핵을 보유하는 북한보다 핵 프로그램을 시작하는 이란에 더 많은 관심과 노력을 집중시킨 점.
4. 중국이 북한의 핵 보유를 반대하면서도 북한의 반발과 붕괴를 피하기 위해 미온적인 정책을 펴 왔던 점.
5. 한국이 “햇볓정책”을 통하여 북한에 핵 개발에 필요한 금융자산을 제공한 점.
6. 북한의 “벼랑끝 전술”이 유효했던 점 등이다.
이렇듯 전문가들에 의하면 북한이 핵무장에 있어서 “돌이킬 수 없는 지점”까지 와 있다는 점에 비추어 한국은 물론 미국과 중국 등은 “전략적 인내” (strategic patience) 등 소극적인 정책에서 벗어나 좀더 적극적이고 집중적인 대처를 할 시점에 와 있는 것이다. 지난 10여년간 미국을 비롯한 각국은 북한의 핵개발과 위협에 대해 다음과 같은 대응책을 추구해 왔다.
1. 북한이 추가 핵 실험을 못하도록 압력을 가하는 것. 이 정책은 북한이 4차 실험을 행함으로써 다시 한번 실패한 것으로 판명 되었다.
2. 북한이 6자회담과 같은 협상장으로 나오게 하는 것.
3. 핵실험, 장거리 미사일 실험 등에 대해 유엔 안보리의 제재를 부과하는 것. 일본 등은 추가로 독자적인 제재도 실시하였다.
4. 유엔 제재 이외의 추가 제재를 위협하는 것.
5. 경제지원, 안전 보장 등 당근 (유인책)을 제시하는 것.
그러나 지금까지 이들 중 어느 방안도 효과를 본 것이 없다. 북한의 핵 무력은 능력과 수량 면에서 계속 증대되고 있고, 이를 유지 강화시키겠다는 북한의 의지도 계속 강화되는 상황이다.
2015년 4월 체결된 이란과의 핵협상 타결 합의 (Iran nuclear deal)는 북핵 문제와 관련하여 어떠한 의미를 갖는가? '이란 딜'은 안보리 5개 상임이사국 (미국, 영국, 프랑스, 러시아, 중국)과 독일 (5 + 1)이 이란에 대한 제재를 해제하는 대신 이란이 최소한 10년간 핵 활동을 중지하겠다고 약속한 합의이다. 미국은 이란이 아직 본격적으로 핵무기 생산에 들어선 것도 아닌데 그 나라의 지정학적 중요성, 석유생산국으로서의 중요성, 중동에서의 위치 등에 비추어 이란핵 문제가 북핵문제보다 더 심각한 것으로 간주했다. 마침 이란이 협상의 용의를 표명하고 러시아, 중국 및 기타 안보리 상임이사국들과 독일의 협조를 받아 이스라엘, 사우디 아라비아 등의 반대에도 불구하고 합의에 성공한 사례이다.
북한과의 협상은 강력한 제재 시행 후에 가능
북핵 문제와 비교해 볼 때, 이란은 아직 핵무기를 확보한 상태가 아니었고, 석유라는 자원을 갖고 있고, 중산층을 갖고 있고, 비교적 합리적인 판단을 할 수 있는 리더쉽을 갖고 있다는 점에서 북한과 다르다고 하겠다. 그러나 북한도 이란과 같이 경제를 개선하고 발전시키겠다는 욕망은 갖고 있다. 동시에 북핵의 경우 그것의 협상에 의한 해결을 강력히 반대하는 미국의 우방—이스라엘, 사우디 아라비아 등 – 이 없는 점은 협상을 위해 좀 더 유리한 면이라고 하겠다. 이러한 점에서 볼 때 앞으로 어떠한 시점, 북한이 4차 핵실험을 한 현재는 아니고 유엔 안보리 등의 강력한 제재로 그 아픔을 뼈저리게 느끼게 될 때, 한국, 미국 등은 6자회담 등을 통하여 북한과 본격적인 협상을 추진해 볼 수 있을 것이다.
북핵의 근본 해결은 통일
북핵의 근본적이고 완전한 해결을 이루기 위해서는 한반도의 통일이 그 완전한 방법이고 첩경이라고 하겠다. 이 것이 미국은 물론 중국, 일본 등 여타 국가들도 한국의 통일을 지지해 주어야 할 중요한 이유중의 하나다. 그러나 통일이 오기까지 시간이 걸린다면 그 동안 국제사회는 강력한 제재를 부과함으로써 북한의 핵정책 변경을 유도하고 정권 자체의 변화까지 가져올 수 있는 방법을 강구해야 할 것이다.
< 다음은 영문판입니다 >
Nuclear North Korea: A Reassessment*
On January 6th, North Korea detonated its fourth nuclear bomb and claimed that it was a hydrogen bomb. It infuriated not only South Korea, Japan, and the United States, but also China which until then had been reluctant to exercise blatant pressure on North Korea to denuclearize. The fourth nuclear test in 10 years since its first test in 2006, whether it is indeed a hydrogen bomb or a boosted fission bomb as many in the outside suspect, also prompted the UN Security Council to decide a harsher and more biting sanctions than before on North Korea.
In conducting the nuclear bomb test, North Korea asserted that it was doing it in order to defend itself from and deter the U.S. threat and aggression against the DPRK. Kim Jong Un, the young North Korean leader, who supposedly ordered the bomb test, probably had other objectives as well. One was related to domestic politics. The test, coming only two days before his birthday celebration, was intended to demonstrate his bravado and achievement to the population, who still have much reservation about the leadership qualities. He also wanted to demonstrate that North Korea is a credible threat to the United States and therefore has to be reckoned with as such. Inasmuch as China had been leaning heavily to keep it from conducting the fourth test, Kim Jong Un, by defying its pressure, wanted to send a strong message to China that he could not and would not knuckle under Chinese pressure. Despite the cost the test would incur, Kim Jong Un also wanted to use the nuclear test as a means to obtain recognition by the international community that Pyongyang was indeed a nuclear weapons power. The proud announcement of the “successful” test was accompanied by the vow that North Korea would never, never give up its nuclear weapons under any circumstances (“even if the heaven tumbles down”)
How did we come to this situation? Some 23 years ago, on March 12, 1993, North Korea declared that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and precipitated the first North Korean nuclear crisis. I had just assumed the post of South Korean Foreign Minister and was charged with the task of working with the United States to bring North Korea back into the NPT fold and put a halt on its nuclear activity. Nineteen months later, we managed to sign the Geneva Agreed Framework (AF), which froze the North Korean nuclear program and reinstituted an IAEA inspection regime in exchange for two 2,000 megawatt Light Water Reactors (LWRs), upon completion of which North Korea promised to dismantle all its nuclear facilities and program.
The agreement had both merits and demerits. Critics were quick to note that the agreement allowed at least several years to pass before the IAEA could conduct the “special inspection” of the undeclared nuclear waste site. What’s more, the agreement “rewarded” North Korea with benefits such as energy supply and light water reactors for its defiance of the IAEA. But considering that it was the special inspection issue that prompted the controversy between Pyongyang and the IAEA, it was not surprising that the Agreed Framework was criticized for failing to accomplish an early “special inspection.”
On the positive side, the agreement put an end to the crisis situation which could have brought about a destructive military clash. It also succeeded in freezing the North Korean nuclear program and activities for 8 years, in effect removing the possibility of its engaging in a plutonium-based nuclear weapons development program. Finally, it gave North Korea a stake in implementing the agreement. The prospect of receiving heavy oil and securing light water reactors gave Pyongyang an incentive to “behave,” at least for a while.
In the meantime, North Korea kept its nuclear program frozen, allowed the IAEA continued inspection of its nuclear facilities, and had the withdrawn fuel rods encased for safe-keeping. The agreement also induced Pyongyang to participate in the four-party talks (of the United States, China, and North and South Korea) which began in December 1997 after much hesitation. There was no question that the relatively restrained behavior of North Korea until 2002 could be attributed to the Geneva agreement with the United States.
However, ten years later in 2003, the AF was abrogated as North Korea started its highly enriched uranium enrichment program (UEP) to build nuclear weapons and restarted its nuclear program openly and actively. After another decade of on-again-and-off again negotiations, North Korea became a self-declared nuclear weapons state with nearly 20 nuclear weapons and with the possibility of possessing anywhere between 50 to 100 nuclear weapons by the year 2020, according to experts in the United States, particularly of an institution based in Washington, DC called 38 North. North Korea has not only proclaimed that it is a nuclear weapons state but also inscribed such a status in the preamble of its Constitution. Today, Pyongyang is propagating what it calls “the policy for parallel development of nuclear weapons and of economy.” Combined with its ballistic missile capability ranging from several hundred to several thousand kilometers and SLBMs (submarine launched ballistic missiles), North Korea’s nuclear weapons pose a threat not only on South Korea but on all its neighboring countries including Japan, China, and even the United States.
Then what went wrong? How can we cope with the threat and the problem?
First, we might ask whether the Geneva Agreed Framework of 1994 was a failure? North Korea cheated by clandestinely starting a uranium enrichment program. Was it because the agreement was at fault? We do not know if North Korea, when it signed the 1994 Agreed Framework, planned to have a clandestine nuclear program later. What we know is that, around 1997-8, when the time was nearing for it to dismantle its nuclear facilities under the agreement, it found an opportunity (by way of A. Q. Khan of Pakistan) to engage in a nuclear program through the HEU (highly enriched uranium) route. Then in 2002-3, it also found the opportunity and excuse to scrap the agreement and openly restart the nuclear program. Since resuming its nuclear activity in earnest in 2003, North Korea made much progress in developing nuclear bombs, making its first test in 2006, second in 2009 and third in 2013. It is estimated that North Korea would have nearly 20 nuclear bombs by the end of last year (2015). In becoming a bona fide nuclear weapons state, North Korea has taken advantage of the United States being bogged down in the Middle East, oscillation of U.S. policies, disarray among the regional countries, and its brinkmanship attitude that defied risks and dangers. It also made use of China's rather lukewarm attitude toward it, which was the result of China's reluctance to push North Korea too far for fear of backlashes and possible collapse. Ten years (1999--2008) of South Korea's indulgent sunshine policy toward the North also helped North Korea to secure a large part of the financing that was needed to develop nuclear weapons. North Korea probably would have developed nuclear weapons anyway regardless of what we had done or not. Nonetheless, criticism is there: that, over the years, we should have done this and that or we shouldn’t have done this and that.
These are what critics say about what we should have done:
1. We should have used force, like bombing North Korea before it crossed the “threshold” (i.e., entering the “zone of immunity”—cf. Israel’s Netanyahu.)
2. We should have insisted on a more effective verification regime. The problem was not so much that it was a bad deal as it was a good agreement, putting a lid on North Korea’s nuclear activity. North Korea decided to cheat and engage in a clandestine program anyway. They argue that we should have at least used more sticks than carrots.
3. Some on the opposite side argue that we should have built the LWRs on schedule to hasten North Korea’s dismantling process of its nuclear facilities.
4. The major powers, especially the United States should have given nuclear North Korea at least as much attention and urgency as they have given to the Iranian nuclear issue.
5. We should have given North Korea a stronger security assurance.
What we should not have done lies mostly on the reverse side of what should have been done:
1. We should not have assumed that the North Korean regime could collapse soon and thereby letting North Korea off the hook rather easily.
2. We should not have agreed to build the LWRs, which are not proliferation resistant anyway. We should not have “bought the same horse twice and thrice” or rewarded bad behavior.
3. We should not have negotiated with North Korea, period (cf. Cheney, Rumsfeld)
4. South Korea should not have, through its “Sunshine Policy”, provided North Korea with financial resources to support the North Korean nuclear development program.
5. The other members of the Six Party Talks than North Korea, especially the United States and South Korea, should not have ruled out the possibility of a regime change in that country for denuclearizing it.
There seems to be some consensus among international experts and/or observers on the following points regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons program:
1. North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons program no matter what happens. There is no carrot that will induce, no stick that will force North Korea to give up nuclear weapons or the development thereof.
2. Libya, Iraq, and Ukraine made North Korea even more resolved to keep the program.
3. The only country that can influence North Korea is China.
4. The only way to denuclearize North Korea may be through regime collapse or change. However, since even regime change (a la South Africa) may not lead North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, the best way could be reunification under the South Korean auspices.
5. The best we can do for the time being is to put a lid, keep it from further testing, and keep the pressure (mostly sanctions) on.
In my view, however, there are two cases which inadvertently and perhaps ironically contributed to North Korea’s march toward becoming a nuclear weapons state. One is the 1992 attempt to force a special inspection of North Korea after the IAEA discovery of the “discrepancy” between the amount of plutonium it admitted to have processed and the amount the IAEA suspected North Korea had produced. The other was the 2002 attempt to probe the North Korean UEP after discovering that North Korea was engaged in that program. The first case is where we placed more emphasis on the past activity rather than on maintaining the current inspection regime of North Korean nuclear activities. The second is where we focused more on the future of North Korean nuclear activity than on maintaining the present system of curtailing it. What I am saying is that, without ignoring or tolerating their past or future infringements, we could have handled the cases differently than we actually did. In 1992, perhaps we insisted a little too much on “special inspection”––aimed at clarifying the “discrepancy” regarding the amount of plutonium North Korea presumably had extracted from its nuclear spent fuel. In 2002, we could have handled the UEP issue with North Korea without dismantling the Geneva accord instead of the North Korean nuclear facilities.
The critical strategic question in 1992 was whether to make North Korea stay with the NPT while seeking for clarification of the “discrepancy” or allow it an excuse to withdraw from the NPT itself. The former would have been more for the present and future, and the latter was placing the present and future at risk in order to probe the past. The former approach would have been for practicality and the latter for principle. In 2002, it was whether we should keep the Geneva accord and work for preventing North Korea’s further work in its UEP or we should let the Agreed Framework collapse in the interest of probing the UEP. Again, the former would have been going for practicality and latter for principle. The former would have been for the present while the latter was more for the future.
Under the circumstances, I would like to emphasize seven points in handling the North Korean nuclear issue.
1. Pragmatic and strategic goals are more important than principles or ideologies.
2. If it is not a surrender agreement, give-and-take arrangements are important. We need to give the other side a stake in implementing the agreement.
3. We need both carrots and sticks, and need to integrate them judiciously.
4. Negotiated arrangements are better than other options such as sanctions or physical means. Sanctions should be used to promote and facilitate negotiation.
5. Even half a loaf is better than no loaf at all.
6. We have to stop the other side’s nuclear program before reversing it.
7. Short of a military defeat or a regime change, we cannot seek a clean, sweeping solution such as complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID), but take practical and feasible, yet urgent and necessary steps must be taken to reverse the increase in North Korean nuclear arsenal.
With the aforementioned observations, let me turn to the present and the future.
Regarding the six-party talks, it seems that China, and to some extent South Korea, seem to be the only parties which still would like to see the process resumed. North Korea, which previously indicated its willingness to return to the talks without preconditions, seems to have lost interest in them. The United States has a precondition: North Korea should take a credible action to prove that it will denuclearize and take a practical step toward denuclearization. The rationale for this precondition is understandable. Initially, President Obama was hopeful that he could reach an agreement with North Korea by "extending a hand" to it. But the overture was quickly rejected by the North, which thereafter conducted a nuclear bomb test and launched ballistic missiles. Hence, since the spring of 2009, the Obama Administration has been taking a rather hard line toward North Korea. It is now saying that the six-party talks cannot be resumed as if nothing had happened during the past several years, especially since 2005, when the agreement was reached on North Korean denuclearization between North Korea and the rest of the six-party talks; namely, the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea.
During the past seven years of no six-party talks, North Korea conducted nuclear tests, fired ballistic missiles, and demonstrated the UEP and even an SLBM capable of launching ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads from under the water. According to the United States, as a matter of principle, North Korea should take a sincere step toward denuclearization before talks can be resumed. Whenever there is a sign from the United States and/or South Korea relaxing or modifying their preconditions for six-party talks, objections are raised arguing that it could send North Korea a “wrong signal,” the signal that may enable North Korea to violate agreements with impunity. Now that North Korea has conducted its fourth nuclear test, the chances of resuming the Six Party Talks have become even more remote.
North Korea’s nuclear program and the erratic, unpredictable behavior of its new leader, Kim Jong Un, present a peculiar dilemma to South Korea and its neighbors. Thus far, the reactions from the powers concerned to the North Korean nuclear threat seem to boil down to the following five strategies:
1. to pressure North Korea not to conduct more nuclear or missile tests (which failed to keep North Korea from conducting the fourth test).
2. to bring North Korea to a negotiating table such as the six-party talks;
3. to threaten with tougher and more stringent economic sanctions by the UN Security Council against Pyongyang’s tests of nuclear weapons or long-range missiles;
4. to threaten with punishments beyond UN sanctions; and
5. to offer inducements such as economic assistance and security guarantee in case North Korea suspends its nuclear weapons program.
Up until now, none of these measures have shown to be effective in reducing, much less stopping, the North Korean nuclear activities. Instead, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is looking increasingly more dangerous in terms of magnitude and capabilities. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are dangerous not only to South Korea but to all of the regional countries including China and Japan. Thus, it may now be the time for the United States and others to reexamine their “strategic patience” approach, which is tantamount to a recipe for inaction. The Iranian nuclear deal of last year (2015) should encourage us to try to persuade North Korea into stopping its nuclear program and reverse the course. Are there any lessons that we can draw from the Iranian nuclear deal of last year? Iran decided to give up its nuclear weapons program in the face of sanctions that go beyond the UN-imposed ones. There were close coordination and consultation among the major powers (5+1 - five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany). Iran had a dire need to see the economic sanctions lifted and to revive its sagging economy. To be sure, North Korea is different from Iran in that it already has nuclear weapons while Iran was yet to operate its program. North Korea has no strategic commodity such as oil it can sell whereas Iran does. But on one point they share a common aspiration -- to improve their economic situation in the face of restlessness among their people.
The outside world can make use of North Korea’s desire to do business with it while holding out the carrot that offers opportunities to improve its economy in exchange for accommodating on the nuclear issue. The United States and South Korea should seek to cooperate and coordinate with the rest of powers concerned, i.e., China, Russia, and Japan, to work for rolling back the North Korean nuclear program even though, if indeed North Korea is successful with its hydrogen bomb program, the price of suspending its nuclear program will get much higher. However, failing to limit the DPRK’s nuclear development now means that its program will only get exponentially more dangerous in the years to come.
One sure way to achieve denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula including North Korea is reunification under the South Korean auspices. Although this, if it ever happens, is a long-term prospect, as the North Korean nuclear program is a major concern and source of threat to all the neighboring countries and the United States, the consequent removal of the problem will be one good reason why they should welcome Korean unification and support its realization. North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, whether it is of thermonuclear or boosted fission variety, presents both the need and opportunity for South Korea, together with the United States and other countries, to seek a different but more effective way of dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat. With radically increasing pressure on North Korea with stronger sanctions, they can seek to change its nuclear policy while at the same time causing a regime change in North Korea that can be a short-cut to resolution of its nuclear problem. (January 07, 2016)
* Speech to be given at the General Meeting of the Korean-American Association, in Seoul, Korea, on January 8th, 2016.
[한승주 고려대학교 명예교수, 전 외무부장관]
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